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RECENT DECISIONS
ARBITRATION-ENFORCEABILITY oF ARBITRATION AmumMENT IN ACTION

SECURITIES ACT oF 1933-PlaintifF sustained a
severe loss in the resale of securities bought from the defendant. Alleging
fraud he sued under section 12(2) of the Securities Act 0£ 1933,1 which
provides for liability when prospectuses or oral communications sent through
channels of interstate commerce falsely state or omit a material fact so as
to render the statement misleading. Pursuant to the Federal Arbitration
Act,2 defendant moved for an order staying proceedings until arbitration had
been had in accordance with an agreement between the parties. The district court denied the order,8 saying that the non-waiver clause4 of the
Securities Act voided a waiver of remedies. The court of appeals reversed
the decision, holding the non-waiver clause applicable only to mandatory
provisions of the act. 5 On certiorari, the Supreme Court held, reversed, two
justices dissenting. Arbitration, with its informal procedure, would not assure
the plaintiff the benefit of being relieved from proving scienter. In view of
the unequal positions of the parties in transactions involving securities, and
the imposing array of remedies which the Securities Act specifically provides
for the buyer, the policy of the statute is better served by avoiding an
arbitration agreement under the non-waiver clause, despite the broad language
of the Arbitration Act. Wilko 11. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 74 S.Ct. 182 (1953).

BY lNvEsToR UNDER nm

148 Stat. L. 84 (1933), 15 U.S.C. (1946) §77l(2).
2 43 Stat. L. 884 (1925), 9 U.S.C. (1946) §3.
8 Wilko v. Swan, (D.C. N.Y. 1952) 107 F. Supp. 75.
4 "Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring any securities
to waive compliance with any provision of this title or of the rules and regulations of the
Commission shall be void." 48 Stat. L. 84 (1933), 15 U.S.C. (1946) §14.
5Wilko v. Swan, (2d Cir. 1953) 201 F. (2d) 439.
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Investors need not show reliance, causal relation, or scienter to recover
under the Securities Act.6 In shifting the burden of proof, the act may be
found to simplify the procedure of the investor's action and to provide a
pattern which conforms to the layman's notions of procedure to a considerable extent. Other federal statutes similarly aimed at controlling the issue
and sale of securities as a means of protecting investors, such as the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934,7 the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935,8
and the Investment Company Act of 1940,9 contain non-waiver clauses almost
identical to that of the Securities Act. In these acts additional sections invalidate "contracts," besides conditions and stipulations, "the performance of
which involves the violation of, or the continuance of any relationship or
practice in violation of, any provision of this title . . • ," thus expanding on
the meaning of the section which the Securities Act has in common with
these acts. The similarity of the aims of these statutes and of the Securities
Act warrants a presumption of affinity of operation. An arbitration agreement per se cannot be said to involve in its performance violation of any
provision of the act. It seems that the terms of the agreement itself must
be closely examined to ascertain whether a violation of the act is contemplated or not.10 Since the word "compliance" is not qualified in the act,
it could cover the purchaser's compliance in preserving the wide selection of
remedies afforded him. But the latter part of section 14, voiding a waiver
of compliance with the rules of the Commission in the same sentence which
voids a waiver of compliance with the provisions of the act, seems to indicate that to be void a waiver must refer to the compliance of the seller,
since the rules of the Commission are addressed solely to him, and the
buyer could not possibly waive his own compliance with them. Likewise
this compliance goes to substantive, mandatory provisions, rather than to
6 If the view is taken that such drastic statutory liability is in substance a disguised
criminal sanction, entrusted to private initiative for its enforcement, an interest of the state
in preventing its waiver might be recognized on grounds of public policy, even without the
help of the non-waiver clause. In the following cases right to arbitration was denied because
of a public interest in the questions involved: Wise v. Johnson, 14 Ala. App. 396, 69 S.
986 (1915) (criminal prosecutions); Kingswood Management Corp. v. Salzman, 272 App.
Div. 328, 70 N.Y.S. (2d) 692 (1947) (statute provided court should set attorney's fee);
Hill v. Hill, 199 Misc. 1035, 104 N.Y.S. (2d) 755 (1951) (custody of children). But
the presence of separate provisions for criminal liability for willful violations of the act,
48 Stat. L. 84 (1933), 15 U.S.C. (1946) §§17-24, and the availability of a defense
showing an honest course of action seem to indicate the purely remedial rather than penal
nature of the action, in substance as well as in form. The procedural modifications made
by the statute may be aimed at relieving the buyer of securities from the disadvantages
suffered on account of the necessity of proving the several elements of a common law action
for fraud, and not only at extending special privileges to a certain class of suitors. On the
general subject see Shulman, "Civil Liability and the Securities Act," 43 YALB L.J. 227
(1933).
1 48 Stat. L. 903 (1934), 52 Stat. L. 1076 (1938), 15 U.S.C. (1946) §78cc.
s49 Stat. L. 835 (1935), 15 U.S.C. (1946) §79z.
9 54 Stat. L. 845 (1940), 15 U.S.C. (1946) §80a-46.
10 An investor may well find arbitration desirable. He can only assure this right for
himself by a binding contract.
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matters connected with the remedial process. It would seem that conllicts
between statutes should be avoided if possible in the interpretative process.
It is one thing to say that it is desirable that the statutory action be tried in
a court of law, and another to say that the Securities Act allows no alternative, no matter how enlightened the choice. Existing remedies at law and
in equity are retained by the act.11 While arbitration perhaps cannot technically be called a remedy, it is a form of trial12 favored in clear, broad language by Congress in the Arbitration Act, and is therefore open to a suitor
under the retaining clause of the Securities Act. The time of the making of
the stipulation seems immaterial, since it is in essence an exercise of the
right to choose a remedy and as such is in harmony with the policy of the
Securities Act. The broad sweep of the Federal Arbitration Act, making arbitration clauses in contracts involving interstate and foreign commerce "valid,
irrevocable and enforceable," has been recognized by the courts.18 Avoidance
of arbitration agreements by operation of the non-waiver clause may induce
buyers to seek a speedy adjudication of their claims with mental reservations
of disregarding an award if dissatisfied.14 It would seem that an arbitration
agreement should stand even though not expressly incorporating the liability
standard of the Securities Act, at least if a repugnant standard is not substituted. Since the seller must comply with the act in sustaining the burden
of proof of lack of scienter, it could be said that by virtue of section 14 the
statutory standard is attached to an arbitration agreement by operation of law.
However, against this view it might be argued that since under the retaining
clause a buyer may not avail himself of the statutory action and so may renounce the benefit of it as to the burden of proof, an arbitration agreement
would be valid even if it denied him any procedural advantage. Courts are
generally reluctant to review an arbitration award on the merits;15 but this
is not so if a legal standard for the decision is set by law or by stipulation.16
1148 Stat. L. 84, §16 (1933), 15 U.S.C. (1946) §77p.
12Murray Oil Products v. Mitsui & Co., (2d Cir. 1944) 146 F. (2d) 381.
1s Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., (2d Cir. 1942) 126 F. (2d)
978; Agostini Bros. Bldg. Corp. v. United States, (4th Cir. 1944) 142 F. (2d) 854.
14 The Securities and Exchange Commission, appearing in the case as amicus curiae
in favor of investor, declined to express an opinion as to the enforceability of an arbitration
agreement entered into after a §12(2) cause of action has been asserted. Wilko v. Swan,
(2d Cir. 1953) 201 F. (2d) 439 at 443. Thus, the Commission avoided the practical
difficulty a party seeking to void an arbitration agreement would find himself in by taking
either position. H the agreement is enforceable after the assertion of the statutory cause
of action, the supposed voiding effect of the non-waiver clause seems to depend on a
question of time or of convenience to the buyer. H not enforceable, one may submit to
arbitration with mental reservations with impunity. Justice Jackson, concurring, seems to
have felt this danger, as he affirms that such agreement after the controversy arises is valid.
15 Karppinen v. Karl Kiefer Machine Co., (2d Cir. 1951) 187 F. (2d) 32; Western
Canada S.S. Co. v. Cia. De Nav. San Leonardo, (D.C. N.Y. 1952) 105 F. Supp. 452.
16 The majority opinion that the federal courts cannot review awards on the merits
except in limited cases is effectively rebutted in the dissent. Justice Frankfurter argues that
if it is true that failure to apply the statutory standard of liability is ground for vacation
of the award, as the majority says, jurisdiction to review the award must be inferred. More-
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Arbitration has a long history of use in the securities market.17 It seems
reasonable to presume that Congress was aware of such widespread practice.
The total absence of more explicit language in the Securities Act to bar
arbitration would seem to refute a legislative intent to that end.

Rinaldo L. Bianchi

over, he implies, want of a record stating the reasons for award, formal or informal, is itself
ground for vacation, since the burden of proof requirement is not under such circumstances
satisfied by the seller. Campbell v. American Fabrics Co., (2d Cir. 1948) 168 F., (2d)
959; Western Union Tel. Co. v. American Communications Assn., 299 N.Y. 177, 86
N.E. (2d) 162 (1949).
17 On the subject see Jacquin, "Arbitration in Action in Wall Street," 1 Aim. J.
(n.s.) 261 (1946).

